The Unreasonable Rise of Reasonable Suspicion: Terrorist Watchlists and Terry v. Ohio by Kahn, Jeffrey
William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal
Volume 26 | Issue 2 Article 7
The Unreasonable Rise of Reasonable Suspicion:
Terrorist Watchlists and Terry v. Ohio
Jeffrey Kahn
Copyright c 2017 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository.
https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmborj
Repository Citation
Jeffrey Kahn, The Unreasonable Rise of Reasonable Suspicion: Terrorist Watchlists and Terry v. Ohio, 26
Wm. & Mary Bill Rts. J. 383 (2017), https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmborj/vol26/iss2/7
THE UNREASONABLE RISE OF REASONABLE SUSPICION:
TERRORIST WATCHLISTS AND TERRY V. OHIO
Jeffrey Kahn*
I cannot inform you that you have been charged with anything or,
rather, I do not know whether you have been or not. You have been
arrested, that is a fact, and that is all I know.
—Franz Kafka, The Trial1
Falling under official suspicion is not a crime punishable by any law in the United
States, nor may anyone be arrested merely on suspicion of having committed some
other crime.2 In 1968, however, the Supreme Court decided Terry v. Ohio and those
assurances of liberty became less absolute.3 After Terry, a “reasonable suspicion” of
illicit activity has been enough for a police officer to briefly detain a person without
triggering any constitutional protections.4 Although not subject to arrest unless and
until the officer has probable cause to believe that person has committed or is about
to commit a crime, the person is not free to walk away from the officer.
Freedom of movement may not be the only liberty lost, as shown by even a brief
survey of Terry’s trajectory in the opinions that followed it. For example, may
police compel the detainee to provide information they seek during such detention?
Chief Justice Warren avoided this question in his opinion for the Court in Terry;5
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1 FRANZ KAFKA, THE TRIAL 12–13 (Mike Mitchell trans., Oxford World’s Classics
2009) (1925).
2 William O. Douglas, Vagrancy and Arrest on Suspicion, 70 YALE L.J. 1, 12 (1960)
(“There is no crime known as ‘suspicion.’ Nor is there any federal crime known as ‘holding
for investigation.’”). Justice Douglas’s article is cited in Brief for Petitioner at 18 n.4, Terry
v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (No. 67). Lest it be thought that “crime of suspicion” is merely a
rhetorical device, a would-be companion case to Terry that was dismissed as improvidently
granted seems to have involved this uncodified infraction. See Wainwright v. City of New
Orleans, 392 U.S. 598, 613 (1968) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (“The circumstances of this case
show that the arrest was no more than arrest on suspicion . . . .”).
3 See 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
4 Id. Of course, the protections of the Fourth Amendment only became applicable to the
conduct of state officials following Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949) (holding that the
Fourth Amendment applies to state searches and seizures, as well as the warrant requirement),
and Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (holding that the exclusionary rule applies to the states).
5 See 392 U.S. at 19 n.16 (“We thus decide nothing today concerning the constitutional
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Justices Harlan and White answered it differently in separate concurrences on
which, the opinion being 8–1, the holding did not depend.6 In 1984, the Court noted
“the absence of any suggestion in our opinions that Terry stops are subject to the
dictates of Miranda [v. Arizona]” in holding that Miranda warnings need not be
given during a non-custodial traffic stop, which the Court analogized to a Terry
stop.7 In 1985, the Court recognized that the merely reasonably suspicious police
officer may in some circumstances detain a person in order to obtain his or her fin-
gerprints.8 In 2004, the Court upheld a state law interpreted to compel a person to
identify himself or herself during a Terry stop under threat of criminal conviction
for giving an untruthful answer or remaining silent.9 The law remains unclear about
propriety of an investigative ‘seizure’ upon less than probable cause for purposes of ‘deten-
tion’ and/or interrogation.”).
6 See id. Justice Harlan appeared to grant the police a right to compel at least some
answers. Id. at 32–33 (Harlan, J., concurring) (stating that the officer’s “right must be more
than the liberty (again, possessed by every citizen) to address questions to other persons, for
ordinarily the person addressed has an equal right to ignore his interrogator and walk away”).
Justice White believed that the detainee could stand silent. Id. at 34 (White, J., concurring)
(“Of course, the person stopped is not obliged to answer, answers may not be compelled, and
refusal to answer furnishes no basis for an arrest, although it may alert the officer to the need
for continued observation.”).
7 Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 439–40 (1984) (“[T]he usual traffic stop is more
analogous to a so-called ‘Terry stop’ . . . . The similarly noncoercive aspect of ordinary traf-
fic stops prompts us to hold that persons temporarily detained pursuant to such stops are not
‘in custody’ for the purposes of Miranda.” (internal citation omitted)).
8 See Hayes v. Florida, 470 U.S. 811, 816–17 (1985) (“None of the foregoing implies that
a brief detention in the field for the purpose of fingerprinting, where there is only reasonable
suspicion not amounting to probable cause, is necessarily impermissible under the Fourth
Amendment. . . . There is thus support in our cases for the view that the Fourth Amendment
would permit seizures for the purpose of fingerprinting, if there is reasonable suspicion that
the suspect has committed a criminal act, if there is a reasonable basis for believing that
fingerprinting will establish or negate the suspect’s connection with that crime, and if the
procedure is carried out with dispatch.”).
9 See Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court, 542 U.S. 177, 187 (2004). The Court interpreted
the state law narrowly: “Provided that the suspect either states his name or communicates it
to the officer by other means—a choice, we assume, that the suspect may make—the statute
is satisfied and no violation occurs.” Id. at 185. The Court was dismissive of Hiibel’s liberty
interest: “As best we can tell, petitioner refused to identify himself only because he thought
his name was none of the officer’s business.” Id. at 190. Hiibel thus lacked any “reasonable
belief that the disclosure would tend to incriminate him” in a way that implicated his Fifth
Amendment rights, leaving that question open for another day. Id. at 191 (“Answering a re-
quest to disclose a name is likely to be so insignificant in the scheme of things as to be incrimi-
nating only in unusual circumstances. . . . Still, a case may arise where there is a substantial
allegation that furnishing identity at the time of a stop would have given the police a link in
the chain of evidence needed to convict the individual of a separate offense. In that case, the
court can then consider whether the privilege applies, and, if the Fifth Amendment has been
violated, what remedy must follow. We need not resolve those questions here.”). Justice
Stevens’s dissent, on the other hand, foreshadowed the world of terrorist watchlists, noting:
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what other information the officer may compel, or by what means, in connection
with a Terry stop.
Terry’s “reasonable suspicion” test was created in the context of domestic law
enforcement, but it did not remain there. This Essay examines the effect of trans-
planting this test into a new context: the world of terrorist watchlists. In this new
context, reasonable suspicion is the standard used to authorize the infringement on
liberty that often results from being watchlisted. But nothing else from the case that
created that standard remains the same. The government official changes from a local
police officer to an anonymous member of the intelligence community. The purpose
changes from crime prevention to counterterrorism. The technology changes from
a police officer’s notebook or filed report to a massive and remote computer data-
bank. And, most significantly, the person who determines whether the reasonable sus-
picion standard has been met changes from a neutral and detached magistrate to the
executive official who harbored the suspicion in the first place.
Forty years after Terry v. Ohio, lawyers and analysts at the FBI’s Terrorist Screen-
ing Center (TSC) expressly drew from that case the reasonable suspicion test used
to populate the many watchlists that are used to fulfill its national security mission.
The repercussions of landing on a watchlist can be severe: access to commercial
aircraft can be denied; visas can be revoked; a job can be lost. And intrepid politicians
(not to mention the TSC itself) have not been shy about expanding the reach of watch-
lists to other areas of life with a pithy logic that is as tweetable as it is deeply flawed.
“If you are too dangerous to fly, then surely you are too dangerous to . . .” fill in the
blank: own a gun, obtain a hazmat license, attend the Super Bowl.10
In this short Essay, I make two points about this unusual legal transplant11 from
the world of crime-fighting to a world in which, once information about a person is
entered into the system, “it can propagate extensively through the government’s inter-
locking complex of databases, like a bad credit report that will never go away.”12
The first point, as Yogi Berra once said, is that applying the reasonable suspicion
standard to terrorist watchlists was a case of “déjà vu all over again”: the same
arguments made in support of lowering the standard for police to detain people they
could not arrest were used to justify its application to the world of watchlists. We
“A name can provide the key to a broad array of information about the person, particularly
in the hands of a police officer with access to a range of law enforcement databases.” Id. at 196
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
10 See discussion infra Part III.
11 See ALAN WATSON, LEGAL TRANSPLANTS: AN APPROACH TO COMPARATIVE LAW (2d
ed. 1993). The use of Alan Watson’s famous transplant metaphor, originally used in the con-
text of comparative law, is deliberate (and, I suppose, ironic given my own transplant of his
concept). When a legal rule is moved from its original context to a new environment, rarely
is its effect predictable or even the rule itself left unchanged by the transplant. This is as true
when a legal rule moves from one country to another as when it moves within a single country
to address a different goal or problem.
12 Ibrahim v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 62 F. Supp. 3d 909, 928 (N.D. Cal. 2014).
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shouldn’t be surprised; the pragmatic pressures that justified lowering the standard
in the context of law enforcement are no different in the context of national security.
The second point is more chilling. The watchlisters have consistently fought to
adopt the reasonable suspicion standard while casting aside the structural check that
the Supreme Court deemed essential to its constitutional use: the judiciary. In the
crime-fighting world of Terry, the expected appearance of the accused before a
magistrate was the norm used to minimize the impact of detention based on this lower
standard. In the world of terrorist watchlists, however, appearance before a magis-
trate has always been an undesired end, to be avoided at all costs.13
In 1968, this same argument for autonomy was made by police regarding “the
rapidly unfolding and often dangerous situations on city streets” that some charac-
terized as a war on crime.14 Back then, John Terry’s lawyers convincingly argued
against “an abdication of judicial control over, and indeed an encouragement of,
substantial interference with liberty and personal security by police officers whose
judgment is necessarily colored by their primary involvement in ‘the often competi-
tive enterprise of ferreting out crime.’”15
Less successful have been the litigants arguing for judicial supervision over the
use of watchlists in what President George W. Bush (in whose administration they
first proliferated) called the “war on terror.”16 Their lawsuits provide insight into what
government action looks like when the reasonable suspicion standard is freed from
judicial oversight. The result is not pretty: this new context and technology only serve
to magnify the pressures to which human nature are susceptible in an essentially un-
changed “competitive enterprise of ferreting out”17 real and perceived terrorists. The
incentives (and fears) that promote watchlisting are often stronger for the analyst
making a decision in front of a computer monitor.18 Why would an analyst choose
to err on the side of not putting someone on a watchlist?
The Terry Court could not have imagined the digital world of terrorist watch-
lists, but it did have the foresight to realize the danger presented by executive officials
unconstrained by the separation of powers. Courts could enforce compliance with
13 See JEFFREY KAHN, MRS. SHIPLEY’S GHOST: THE RIGHT TO TRAVEL AND TERRORIST
WATCHLISTS 3–4 (2013).
14 Terry, 392 U.S. at 10.
15 Id. at 12 (quoting Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948)).
16 President George W. Bush, Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American
People (Sept. 20, 2001) (transcript available at A Nation Challenged; President Bush’s Ad-
dress on Terrorism Before a Joint Meeting of Congress, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 21, 2001), http://
www.nytimes.com/2001/09/21/us/nation-challenged-president-bush-s-address-terrorism-before
-joint-meeting.html).
17 Terry, 392 U.S. at 12 (quoting Johnson, 333 U.S. at 14).
18 See Jeffrey Kahn, Terrorist Watchlists, in THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF SURVEIL-
LANCE LAW 71, 87 (David Gray & Stephen E. Henderson eds., 2017 ) (quoting first TSC
Director Donna Bucella that “to err on the side of caution, individuals with any degree of a
terrorism nexus were included” in the Terrorist Screening Database).
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the Fourth Amendment with an exclusionary rule that forbade use at trial of improp-
erly obtained evidence because a courtroom was the inevitable last step in the process
that started with an arrest. But that rule “is powerless to deter invasions of constitu-
tionally guaranteed rights where the police either have no interest in prosecuting or
are willing to forgo successful prosecution in the interest of serving some other
goal.”19 The goal of terrorist watchlists is not prosecution or even law enforcement;
watchlists are used to investigate, disrupt, and prevent terrorist activity in ways that
do not inevitably (in fact quite rarely) lead to an open hearing in court.20
In the sections that follow, I briefly summarize the Terry case to highlight its essen-
tial features. I then provide an equally brief summary of the systems and institutions
of terrorist watchlisting that emerged after the terrorist attacks of September 11,
2001, and document how the Terry reasonable suspicion standard was incorporated
into them. I then make some predictions about how watchlisting systems will continue
to use the reasonable suspicion standard, but not with a steadfast opposition to meaning-
ful judicial supervision, which is not the way that its judicial originators intended.
I. TERRY V. OHIO
Terry v. Ohio came to the Supreme Court because Cleveland Police Detective
Martin McFadden suspected John Terry and two confederates of “casing a job, a stick-
up” of a jewelry store in downtown Cleveland one afternoon.21 After watching them
walk up and down a city block for ten or twelve minutes, McFadden approached the
trio and asked for their names.22 Unsatisfied with the mumbled response, “McFadden
grabbed petitioner Terry, spun him around . . . and patted down the outside of his
clothing.”23 Repeating the pat down on the others, two guns were found, leading to
Terry’s conviction for carrying concealed weapons.24
The trial court denied a motion to suppress this evidence because, although
McFadden lacked probable cause to arrest the men for carrying concealed weapons
when he stopped and frisked them, “the defendants were conducting themselves sus-
piciously, and some interrogation should be made of their action.”25 Ohio’s appellate
courts declined to overturn the trial court on this point, and the United States Supreme
Court affirmed the convictions by a vote of 8–1 (Justice Douglas dissenting).
The Court did so not by distinguishing a stop-and-frisk procedure from the
searches and seizures governed by the Fourth Amendment, which was the approach of
the lower courts.26 Rather, the Court took a pragmatic view of what it euphemistically
19 Terry, 392 U.S. at 14.
20 See generally KAHN, supra note 13.
21 Terry, 392 U.S. at 6.
22 See id. at 6–7.
23 Id. at 7.
24 See id. at 7–8.
25 Id. at 8.
26 See id. at 10 & n.3, 16 & n.12.
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called “encounters between citizens and police officers [that] are incredibly rich in
diversity.”27 The Court did not wish to hobble the police by requiring probable cause
for every such “encounter,” even the involuntary ones.
As a result, the Terry stop was born. This new standard required that the officer
“be able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational
inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion.”28 So long as the stop
was relatively brief, the Supreme Court held that the Fourth Amendment would not
be violated by the officer’s interference with a person’s liberty in the name of “ef-
fective crime prevention and detection . . . .”29 Nor did the Court think such a short-
lived intrusion could deprive someone of liberty within the meaning of the due
process clauses of the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendments.30
Why did the Terry Court think police could stop people like this?31 Most of all,
because if anything came of the police officer’s action, a judge would be interposed
between the stop and any criminal sanction.32 If no arrest resulted from the stop, no
harm was done; the detention was a brief inconvenience necessary for “effective crime
prevention and detection.”33 But the Court believed that if the initial reasonable sus-
picion that permitted the Terry stop should develop into probable cause to arrest,
then what was crucial was the inevitable intercession of a magistrate to independently
assess the state’s actions—to police the police—and offer a remedy for any excesses.34
27 Id. at 13.
28 Id. at 21. In case of any doubt, Justice Harlan’s concurring opinion confirms his view
that the Court has determined that the police officer “ha[s] constitutional grounds to insist
on an encounter, to make a forcible stop.” Id. at 32. Justice White, separately concurring,
agreed: “[T]he person may be briefly detained against his will while pertinent questions are
directed to him.” Id. at 34.
29 Id. at 22 (majority opinion). The second part of the opinion, concerning the frisk for
purposes of officer safety, is not relevant to terrorist watchlists, although the reasonableness
test is essentially the same as that permitting the initial stop: “[I]n determining whether the
officer acted reasonably in such circumstances, due weight must be given, not to his inchoate
and unparticularized suspicion or ‘hunch,’ but to the specific reasonable inferences which
he is entitled to draw from the facts in light of his experience.” Id. at 27 (citation omitted).
30 See id. at 30–31. In fact, although understandable given the Fourth Amendment context
of a motion to suppress evidence of an unlawful arrest, no party or amicus brief even raised
the broader liberty point, and the Court did not entertain the idea sua sponte either during
oral argument or in its opinion. See generally 66 LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS OF
THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 301–718 (Philip B.
Kurland & Gerhard Casper eds., 1975).
31 Justice Douglas dissented, and clearly did not think the police had such a dominion:
“To give power to the police to seize a person on some grounds different from or less than
‘probable cause’ would be handing them more authority than could be exercised by a magis-
trate in issuing a warrant to seize a person.” Terry, 392 U.S. at 36 n.3.
32 Id. at 21 (majority opinion).
33 Id. at 22.
34 See id. at 21.
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Immediately after stating the reasonable suspicion standard, Chief Justice Earl
Warren wrote:
The scheme of the Fourth Amendment becomes meaningful only
when it is assured that at some point the conduct of those charged
with enforcing the laws can be subjected to the more detached,
neutral scrutiny of a judge who must evaluate the reasonableness
of a particular search or seizure in light of the particular circum-
stances.35
Scholars point to historical practices that confirm that this could occur either at a
criminal trial or through a civil suit by someone aggrieved by police conduct but
deprived of a criminal justice forum in which to complain about it.36
Since 1968, the reasonable suspicion standard has crept into other aspects of
criminal justice and the Fourth Amendment. A reasonable suspicion is now suffi-
cient for public school authorities to search a student37 and for a public employer to
search for work-related offenses by an employee.38 In 1983, the Court approved
reasonable suspicion-based area searches beyond the detainee’s person or reach at
places where “investigative detentions” had occurred (e.g., the passenger compart-
ment of a car);39 building on that case seven years later, the Court permitted “protec-
tive sweeps” following arrests made at a person’s home.40 In 1995, the Court held
that a reasonable suspicion, not probable cause, was sufficient for the no-knock
aspect of an otherwise lawful warrant.41 In 2001, the Court held that reasonable
suspicion was sufficient to conduct a search of a probationer’s house.42 In many
states, reasonable suspicion is the standard that sets the threshold for individuals
required to report child abuse to a government official.43 In every case, however, the
35 Id.
36 See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, Terry and Fourth Amendment First Principles, 72 ST.
JOHN’S L. REV. 1097, 1111 (1998) (“If officers searched with a valid warrant, they could not
be sued for simply carrying out that warrant within its terms; however, if they lacked a war-
rant and nonetheless decided to search or seize, they risked a trespass lawsuit, in which a
civil jury would typically decide whether their search or seizure was reasonable.”); see also
id. at 1119 (“The tort law model is not only evident from history, but also deducible from a
close reading of text: It is, after all, tort law that generally secures persons against invasions
of their persons, houses, papers, and effects.”).
37 See generally New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
38 See generally O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709 (1987).
39 See generally Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983).
40 See generally Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325 (1990).
41 See generally Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927 (1995).
42 See generally United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112 (2001).
43 See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 11166 (West 2017); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 32A-4-3 (West
2017); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 4913 (West 2017).
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judicial backstop that made constitutional protections “meaningful” in Terry stands
ready to evaluate the reasonableness of that suspicion.
Terrorist watchlists are not run by local police and do not involve state or federal
criminal law.44 So with an eye to the next section of this Essay, one final word should
be made about Chief Justice Warren’s placement of such a high value on access to
a neutral, third-party magistrate. What held true in the criminal context for the role
of the judiciary is just as “meaningful” in civil contexts.45 Our administrative law
state is premised on the idea that when government officials issue orders or make de-
cisions that affect an individual’s liberty or property—e.g., by denying or revoking
a license, imposing a fine, seizing property, or prohibiting some conduct—their initial
judgment is rarely the end of the matter.46 “Judicial review is essential to the legiti-
macy of the administrative process; it is the balance wheel of administrative law.”47
II. TERRORIST WATCHLISTS
When someone’s name is placed on a terrorist watchlist—the most well-known
of such things is the so-called No-Fly List48—there is no Fourth Amendment issue.
No one is subject to a search (beyond the generally applicable, suspicionless admin-
istrative searches at airport security checkpoints) for being no-flied.49 And no one
is seized; the hapless would-be traveler has broken no law. There is, however, a
substantial deprivation of liberty that implicates procedural aspects of due process,
if not the substantive component as well.50 And, if the traveler is a citizen overseas,
44 See KAHN, supra note 13, at 166–72.
45 Indeed, Chief Justice Warren emphasized that this holding (declining to find a Fourth
Amendment violation) “should in no way discourage the employment of other remedies than the
exclusionary rule to curtail abuses for which that sanction may prove inappropriate.” Terry, 392
U.S. at 15.
46 See 5 U.S.C. §§ 701–706 (2012).
47 BERNARD SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 470 (3d ed. 1991) (internal footnote
omitted).
48 There are many watchlists that involve many different government agencies and opera-
tions. This Essay focuses on the No-Fly List for reason of the more extensive litigation that
has resulted from it. For a broader description of the universe of watchlists, see KAHN, supra
note 13. An increasingly complete repository of watchlist litigation documents is available
at my website, http://www.watchlistlaw.com [https://perma.cc/ZU6N-QSP5].
49 Another watchlist, the Selectee List, does result in enhanced security screening at
airport security checkpoints. These checkpoint searches have been held to be reasonable
under the Fourth Amendment. See United States v. Aukai, 497 F.3d 955, 959–60 (9th Cir.
2007). To my knowledge, only one lawsuit has been attempted by someone placed on the
Selectee List, a pilot named Erich Scherfen. See Scherfen v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec.,
No. 3:CV-08-1554, 2010 WL 456784 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 2, 2010). After delays that nearly cost
Scherfen his job, DHS successfully moved to dismiss his complaint for lack of a continuing
injury-in-fact. See KAHN, supra note 13, at 22–25.
50 See Latif v. Holder, 969 F. Supp. 2d 1293, 1303 (D. Or. 2013). Until relatively recently,
this fact was fiercely contested by the watchlisting community as defended by the Department
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the de facto exile that may be accomplished by the No-Fly List has profound im-
plications for the relationship between citizen and state.51
Understanding the current system requires a brief journey back in time. Aviation
security was originally the responsibility of the Federal Aviation Administration
(FAA).52 An abrupt rise in hijackings in the 1960s, and more violent terrorist attacks
in the 1970s and 1980s, led to an increasing array of tools to protect passengers.53
The most significant of these tools was created after the 1988 bombing of Pan Am
Flight 103 over Lockerbie.54 The FAA began to issue what it called security direc-
tives whenever it could identify a “specific and credible threat” to civil aviation, a
test that set a fairly high bar.55 These were obligatory orders to airlines to take
concrete security actions of various kinds, including barring a particular passenger
from a flight.56 Such name-based security directives were slow and cumbersome—
they were sent by fax to airline security directors and required the sign-off of other
federal agencies whose intelligence the FAA used.57 But these security directives
were the original “No Fly List,” and would be the vehicle for the future one.
On September 10, 2001, the latest FAA Security Directives identified twelve
people deemed to pose a direct threat to civil aviation (none of them were among the
nineteen terrorists who perpetrated the attack the following day).58 This disturbing
result was a function of two problems. First, a lack of interest in the FAA’s security
role; an aircraft hadn’t been hijacked in the United States for ten years.59 Second, a
lack of intelligence sharing among the many federal agencies that tended to hoard
their information, sources and methods of intelligence gathering. The agencies were
more competitive than collaborative.60
of Justice (DOJ). DOJ repeatedly characterized the alleged injury as an inconvenience to one
mode of transportation, not a deprivation of freedom of movement. See discussion infra Conclu-
sion. In more than one lawsuit, DOJ pointed to the existence of passenger and cargo ships,
though often failing to mention the existence of a maritime watchlist, too. See Kahn, supra
note 18, at 93–94, 93 n.95.
51 See 49 U.S.C. § 44902 (2012).
52 See, e.g., KAHN, supra note 13, at 128–34 (discussing the FAA’s authority over air safety).
53 Id. at 126–36 (detailing the FAA’s attempts to secure air safety).
54 Id. at 132.
55 Id. at 133.
56 Private airlines, fearful of lawsuits, liked this approach. Even though Congress had
given them statutory authority since 1961 to “refuse to transport a passenger or property the
carrier decides is, or might be, inimical to safety,” now codified at 49 U.S.C. § 44902(b),
security directives provided a government determination that served to backstop any decision
by the airline to take advantage of this exemption from its normal common carrier obliga-
tions. Cf. KAHN, supra note 13, at 133–34.
57 KAHN, supra note 13, at 133–34.
58 See id. at 136.
59 Id.
60 See id. at 136–37.
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Correcting these two flaws became a central interest after 9/11. The little-known
and under-used security directive was suddenly very popular.61 Databases at the FBI,
State Department, and elsewhere that had previously operated in separate silos,
guarded by agencies unwilling to share intelligence with each other, were quickly
consolidated to create the No-Fly List.62 When the Transportation Security Adminis-
tration (TSA) was created by Congress in November 2001, the power to issue these
security directives was transferred from the FAA to the TSA.63
Within two months, sixteen names became 400 names; by December 2001,
almost six hundred people were on what was now called the No-Fly List.64 More and
more FBI Special Agents were soon submitting names for watchlisting.65 There was
no reason not to do so—who wanted to explain after a terrorist attack why the perpe-
trator had not been watchlisted? Indeed, the FBI’s dominating position in adding
names to the No-Fly List sometimes made it hard to perceive who was in charge.66
FBI agents expected their nominations to be quickly added to the list, while the
fledgling TSA, flush with the attention of its carry-over security directive, sought
to stake out its turf.67 FBI agents quickly realized an ulterior use for watchlisting: not
just to address a “specific and credible threat” to civil aviation, but to further their
counterterrorism investigations.68 The No-Fly List was a useful tool to coerce in-
formants and question people abroad. Congress subtly recognized this expanded role
for security directives, authorizing the use of databases to identify individuals “who
may pose a risk to transportation or national security.”69 The disjunctive meant that
the old FAA security directive could now be used even when civil aviation, or even
transportation generally, was not the subject of concern.
At the same time that the No-Fly List was expanding so rapidly, the Bush Ad-
ministration sought to correct the other problem: the lack of intelligence sharing that
hobbled the use of security directives by the FAA in the past. To do this, two new
institutions were created within the Intelligence Community. First, what eventually
became known as the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) was established
with headquarters in McLean, Virginia.70 Congress tasked the NCTC with responsi-
bility for gathering in one place all intelligence on international terrorism held by
61 See id. at 173–84 (detailing the shift in usage of the security directive post-9/11).
62 See id. at 136, 173–84.
63 Id. at 139.
64 See Kahn, supra note 18, at 88 tbl.3.2.
65 See KAHN, supra note 13, at 154–66.
66 Id. at 160–71 (discussing the list, its criteria, and the process).
67 Id. at 140–45.
68 See id. at 31, 46, 52, 175; see also Kahn, supra note 18, at 78, 90.
69 Aviation and Transportation Security Act, Pub. L. 107-71, § 101(a), 115 Stat. 597, 599
(2001) (codified at 49 U.S.C. § 114(h)(1) (2012)).
70 See History, OFF. OF THE DIRECTOR OF NAT’L INTELLIGENCE: NAT’L COUNTER-
TERRORISM CTR., http://www.dni.gov/index.php/nctc-who-we-are/history [https://perma.cc
/B3AR-3GWL] (last visited Dec. 4, 2017).
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the United States Government.71 (Intelligence on purely domestic terrorism would
continue to be the province of the FBI.)
Second, and of particular importance to the subject of this Essay, a new organi-
zation within the FBI was created, the Terrorist Screening Center (TSC).72 The TSC
was not the product of any statute; its existence was and remains solely the product
of a presidential order.73 The job of the TSC was twofold. First, the TSC was tasked
to create the Terrorist Screening Database, an unclassified sort of card catalog of the
detailed and highly classified intelligence on international terrorism (at the NCTC)
and purely domestic terrorism (at the FBI).74 In the words of the man who designed
the system, and who would later become one of the longest serving directors of the
TSC, the Terrorist Screening Database was the “bucket that had them all in there.”75
Second, the TSC would create from the Terrorist Screening Database a variety of
watchlists that could be used by various federal, state, and local agencies with the
24/7/365 support of the TSC as liaison between front-line officials and the analysts
and sources of intelligence they used.76 Thus, the TSC would create the content of
the No-Fly List that the TSA would then put into effect with a security directive.
III. TERRY AND TERRORIST WATCHLISTS
As of September 2014, when the most recent official statement was made, the Ter-
rorist Screening Database contained 800,000 identities and the No-Fly List contained
64,000 identities.77 So how does a person wind up on these watchlists? In the panicked
days after 9/11, the No-Fly List was flooded with names on the theory that it could
all be sorted out later. It was better to err on the side of caution. But as the list grew,
false positives made for embarrassing headlines (the singer Cat Stevens, the senator’s
wife Cat Stevens, and plenty of veterans, toddlers and elderly found themselves barred
from flights), and distance from September 11 allowed for a collective breath-
catching and reassessment, a need to impose greater consistency was felt proper.78
Assuming sufficient biographical or biometric details to identify an individual,
the watchlisting community established different substantive criteria for placing a
person on a watchlist. These started out fairly low. In 2007, merely some “evidence
71 Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 § 1021, 50 U.S.C. § 3056
(Supp. II 2013–2015).
72 See KAHN, supra note 13, at 147–48.
73 Directive on Integration and Use of Screening Information to Protect Against Terror-
ism, 39 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1234–35 (Sept. 16, 2003).
74 See KAHN, supra note 13, at 13, 147, 149.
75 Interview with Timothy Healy, former Dir., Terrorist Screening Ctr., in Washington,
D.C. (Dec. 4, 2009) [hereinafter Healy Interview].
76 See KAHN, supra note 13, at 147–48.
77 Safeguarding Privacy and Civil Liberties While Keeping Our Skies Safe: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Transp. Sec. of the H. Comm. on Homeland Sec., 113th Cong. 25
(2014) (statement of Christopher M. Piehota, Director, Terrorist Screening Center).
78 See KAHN, supra note 13, at 27–32.
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of a nexus to terrorism” was required to be nominated to the Terrorist Screening
Database.79 Other watchlists derived from this one used additional criteria that changed
over time and in response to different threats.80
But how to evaluate whether these criteria were met? This required a standard,
which the general counsel to the TSC, Jacqueline “Lyn” Brown, was instrumental
in drafting.81 As the reader will have long since guessed, she took her inspiration from
Terry. Beginning in 2008, a working group was convened of subject-matter experts
from more than a half dozen agencies. The guidance document that the group pro-
duced was approved by the Deputies Committee of the White House’s Homeland
Security Council in January 2009 and issued as a guide to the watchlisting and intel-
ligence communities for common definitions and standards in the watchlisting
process.82 As TSC Director Timothy Healy told Congress in December 2009, using
Terry’s phrasing nearly verbatim:
[T]he facts and circumstances pertaining to the nomination must
meet the “reasonable suspicion” standard of review established
by terrorist screening Presidential Directives. Reasonable suspi-
cion requires “articulable” facts which, taken together with rational
inferences, reasonably warrant a determination that an individual
is known or suspected to be or has been engaged in conduct con-
stituting, in preparation for, in aid of or related to terrorism and ter-
rorist activities, and is based on the totality of the circumstances.83
New watchlisting guidance documents were issued in July 2010 and March 2013.84
But the standard of review has remained constant.85 The reasonable suspicion standard
79 Id. at 166.
80 Id. at 166–71.
81 Id. at 303 n.11.
82 Id. at 303 n.12.
83 Five Years After the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act: Stopping Ter-
rorist Travel: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Governmental Affairs,
111th Cong. 91 (2009) (statement of Timothy J. Healy, Director, Terrorist Screening Center).
The standard was essentially unchanged as of the latest known watchlisting guidance, dated
March 2013, and leaked by The Intercept. Jeremy Scahill & Ryan Devereaux, The Secret Gov-
ernment Rulebook for Labeling You a Terrorist, THE INTERCEPT (July 23, 2014, 2:45 PM),
https://theintercept.com/2014/07/23/blacklisted [https://perma.cc/K32M-WT4R].
84 NAT’L COUNTERTERRORISM CTR., WATCHLISTING GUIDANCE para. 4.3 (2013), https://
www.eff.org/files/2014/07/24/2013-watchlist-guidance_1.pdf [https://perma.cc/8CLV-RU6Z].
85 The terms “known terrorist” and “suspected terrorist” have also been defined, with a
weird result in applying this standard. A “suspected terrorist,” for example, is defined as some-
one “who is reasonably suspected to be, or ha[s] been, engaged in conduct constituting, in
preparation for, in aid of, or related to terrorism and terrorist activities based on an articulable
and reasonable suspicion.” See Healy Interview, supra note 75. This led one judge to conclude
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had the advantage of appearing to impose limits while allowing greater breadth of
discretion.86 Of course, like the TSC itself, it was entirely a creature of executive
discretion. No statute mandated this or any other standard. The watchlisting guid-
ance in which it was found was never meant to be public. There were, and are, no
notice-and-comment regulations to govern watchlisting.
The adoption of the Terry stop standard by the watchlisting community is a
fascinating legal transplant. In an interview, Ms. Brown told me that her working
group was well aware of the criminal investigative context that was at the heart of
Terry. And there was concern expressed about how it might be applied in the intelli-
gence context. As a result, there is no mention of the case by name in their watchlisting
guidance and the working group was careful to refer to the “Reasonable Suspicion
Standard” and not the “Terry Standard.”87
There is no reason to think that Ms. Brown consulted the briefs filed in the Terry
case; she emphasized to me that she and her working group colleagues were careful
to use Terry only as their inspirational starting point. So it is unlikely that she read
Solicitor General Erwin Griswold’s brief for the United States, filed as an amicus
curiae in Terry.88 But General Griswold’s brief is Cassandra-like in its forecast of
the arguments that were to come for the extension of the Terry stop into a technolog-
ical world that hadn’t even been conceived at the time.89 Referencing the history of
England and the colonies, the United States described “a system of watchmen dating
back to the Norman kings.”90 These watchmen, precursors to a modern police force,
“ha[d] the power to detain persons, at least at night, until they could account for
their presence.”91 The United States described the system as further support for a
distinction between arrest to answer criminal charges—requiring probable cause—and
that “an American citizen can find himself labeled a suspected terrorist because of a ‘reason-
able suspicion’ based on a ‘reasonable suspicion.’” Mohamed v. Holder, 995 F. Supp. 2d 520,
531–32 (E.D. Va. 2014).
86 See Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330 (1990) (“Reasonable suspicion is a less de-
manding standard than probable cause not only in the sense that reasonable suspicion can be
established with information that is different in quantity or content than that required to
establish probable cause, but also in the sense that reasonable suspicion can arise from
information that is less reliable than that required to show probable cause.”).
87 Interview with Jacqueline Brown, Gen. Counsel, Terrorist Screening Ctr., in Wash-
ington, D.C. (Mar. 8, 2010). As Shirin Sinnar reports, then-TSC Director Timothy Healy
confirmed that Terry was used as “a baseline” in his 2010 testimony to a congressional com-
mittee. See Shirin Sinnar, Rule of Law Tropes in National Security, 129 HARV. L. REV. 1566,
1598 (2016). Sinnar also describes what she terms occasional “disingenuous” backpedaling
on the connection with Terry. Id.




91 Id. at 7.
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“[a] limited detention in the course of a police investigation [that] does not con-
template the bringing of an individual into court to answer to specific charges.”92
The United States argued that this power finds a “strong justification in the needs
of our society,” just as the role of watchmen were necessary centuries before.93 What
is more, the United States asserted, no citizen should feel anything less than civic-
minded if stopped pursuant to this authority, which amounted (assuming no wrong-
doing) to only a modest inconvenience:
Moreover, it seems appropriate to add that the citizen called upon
to respond to such limited inquiry does not suffer the obloquy
which may be associated with an arrest. Rather, he is performing
the ordinary civic duty, familiar in all organized societies, to
provide information in aid of law enforcement.94
These were very similar to the motivations and justifications for a broad watchlisting
system that would be offered decades later. Interestingly, however, the Solicitor Gen-
eral’s Office took a more limited view of this police power in 1968 than Lyn Brown in
2009. For Griswold’s brief invited the courts to take an active role in overseeing its use:
The power of limited detention which we support is one which
must be carefully circumscribed, and it is the function of the
courts, in keeping with their tradition, to confine it within proper
bounds—to chart the course between the recognized danger of
police abuse on the one hand and the not insignificant danger of
police paralysis on the other.95
92 Id. at 5.
93 Id.
94 Id. at 9.
95 Id. at 10. Indeed, this earlier willingness of the United States to limit the use of the “rea-
sonable suspicion”–based detention would seem to run against the very nature of terrorist
watchlists:
[T]he constitutional standard must be one of reasonableness under the
circumstances. When the suspected offense is not serious and a modicum
of essential information (e.g., the suspect’s identity and address) has been
obtained, so that the police would suffer little more than inconvenience
if the citizen were permitted to go his way, it is reasonable to restrict
the allowable period of the detention to very narrow limits. Conversely,
where the person is unknown to the police, the offense under investiga-
tion is serious, and the suspect’s explanation is equivocal, a detention
for a somewhat longer (though not protracted) period would seem proper,
at least where the questioning is on the scene.
Id. at 13. Nothing in this description fits watchlisting, in which the “suspect’s identity and ad-
dress” or other biographical details are necessarily known and there is no offense to investigate.
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The Court recognized that the exclusionary rule would be the most obvious
mechanism of enforcing these boundaries, but went out of its way to state further
that “our approval of legitimate and restrained investigative conduct undertaken on
the basis of ample factual justification should in no way discourage the employment
of other remedies than the exclusionary rule to curtail abuses for which that sanction
may prove inappropriate.”96
The view of the watchlisting community was just the opposite. When forced into
a courtroom, the Justice Department fought for the watchlisters’ near complete
autonomy, and did so by arguing for near complete deference to its expertise and its
procedures, while seeking to shield the actual decision makers from judicial, not to
mention public, scrutiny. If a lawsuit was filed against the TSC, the Justice Depart-
ment moved to dismiss on the grounds that the TSA was an indispensable party that
could not be joined in the district court.97 This was accomplished by arguing that an
old statute (first established for the FAA) required legal challenges to TSA orders
(such as the security directives that put the No-Fly List into effect) to be brought in
one of the U.S. courts of appeals.98 This provision was almost certainly intended for
standard FAA administrative actions—license revocations, permits, etc.—the sort
of matters in which an administrative record really would constitute the universe of
information necessary to adjudicate the dispute. (There is no record of anyone
subject to a pre-9/11 security directive challenging that placement in court or any-
where else.) But in the new context of terrorist watchlists, in which the record was
very much in dispute, this had the effect of preventing discovery, witness testimony,
and other forms of testing the reasonableness of the agency’s suspicion by limiting
review to the agency’s administrative record, which was often sealed for national
security reasons.99
The value of that adversarial process, presumed so essential in the original Terry
case, was brought home in the only No-Fly List case to overcome these impediments
and receive an actual bench trial. Rahinah Ibrahim fought for her day in court for
eight years after she found herself placed on numerous watchlists and stripped of her
96 Terry, 392 U.S. at 15.
97 See, e.g., Ibrahim v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 62 F. Supp. 3d 909, 911 (N.D. Cal. 2014).
98 See 49 U.S.C. § 46110 (2012).
99 A peripheral but important point is worth mentioning here: law trails technology. Thus,
there is a certain pernicious quality to applying a doctrine like the one developed in Terry v.
Ohio—a world that lacked portable radios (let alone camera-equipped cell phones) or even
a 911 telephone system—to a world of near ubiquitous electronic surveillance in most major
urban areas. See James J. Fyfe, Terry: A[n Ex-]Cop’s View, 72 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1231,
1232 (1998); Reuben M. Payne, The Prosecutor’s Perspective on Terry: Detective McFadden
Had a Right to Protect Himself, 72 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 733, 736 (1998). Similarly, there is
a danger in the unexamined shift of an old FAA statute designed for a quite standard admin-
istrative law context to apply in the novel administrative law context of multi-agency shared
action often reliant on classified national security information.
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student visa.100 After two trips to the Ninth Circuit to battle against jurisdictional
defenses, she was finally able to force the FBI Special Agent who nominated her to
these watchlists to sit for a deposition, where the truth of his incompetence was re-
vealed.101 In the words of Judge Alsup:
At long last, the government has conceded that plaintiff poses no
threat to air safety or national security and should never have been
placed on the no-fly list. She got there by human error within the
FBI. This too is conceded. This was no minor human error but
an error with palpable impact, leading to the humiliation, cuff-
ing, and incarceration of an innocent and incapacitated air trav-
eler. That it was human error may seem hard to accept—the FBI
agent filled out the nomination form in a way exactly opposite
from the instruction on the form, a bureaucratic analogy to a
surgeon amputating the wrong digit . . . .102
It is worth pausing to explore the effect of structuring a nomination form in the
way the TSC structured this one. The approach taken in this nomination form was to
assume that a person should be nominated to all available watchlists.103 The instruc-
tions to the FBI Agent filling out the form were to opt out of any watchlists not desired,
rather than to select the one (or more than one) that was desired.104 (Thus, this agent’s
error seemed to be a failure to read the directions: he ticked the boxes with the mind-
set of opting in to each one individually, not opting out of automatic inclusion in
all.105) These instructions are further evidence of the importance of a structural check
in the person of a neutral, third-party magistrate.106 The instructions are not written
to facilitate an FBI Agent (in the words of Terry and its parroting by TSC Director
Healy) who sought to “be able to point to specific and articulable facts [that] . . .
reasonably warrant that intrusion” caused by nomination to each watchlist.107 Rather,
the instructions encouraged a sweeping approach that took extra effort to individual-
ize based on the actual facts known or surmised.108 It is hard to square a nomination
form designed with such a blanket approach with the intent to limit the intrusion of
watchlists to what the facts “reasonably warrant” in each particular case.
100 See generally Ibrahim, 62 F. Supp. 3d at 915–27. Full disclosure: I testified as an ex-
pert witness for the plaintiff in this case.
101 Id. at 911–12, 916.
102 Id. at 927–28.
103 See id. at 916.
104 See id.
105 Id.
106 Id.; Terry, 392 U.S. at 21–22.
107 See Terry, 392 U.S. at 21.
108 See, e.g., Ibrahim, 62 F. Supp. 3d at 916 (discussing the process of selecting an indi-
vidual for the No-Fly List).
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One more amicus brief filed in Terry is worth mentioning in this context: the
one authored by Jack Greenberg and other lawyers for the NAACP.109 This was a
classic Brandeis brief designed with one purpose in mind: to represent the views of
“the potential victim both of crime and of law enforcement” who, due to racial prej-
udice, was more likely to suffer police abuse of a “reasonable suspicion” standard
than police protection from it.110 The essential problem that the NAACP found with
the flexible reasonable suspicion standard is just what made it so appealing to the
watchlisters:
For the native quality of “reasonable suspicion” . . . consists
precisely in judicial recognition of the trained police “hunch” or
“intuition,” without more, as the basis for legitimating police
action. All of the mysticism of police expertise, of police “feel”
for a street situation, is invoked here. Judges are not expected to
detach themselves from the reasoning processes of the police.
They are not to take an independent view of police logic. They
are to assimilate police logic and appraise the officer’s work
product by its lights. They are to accept the attitudes of police
intelligence for the purpose of adjudging the soundness of police
guesswork—exclusively in cases, of course, where that guess-
work has already proved itself right.111
Past and present directors of the TSC have repeatedly vowed that a mere “hunch”
is insufficient to pass their version of the reasonable suspicion test.112 But the nature
of watchlisting, of course, is not scientific. Much like the policeman on the beat, the
analysts at the TSC are making “predictive judgments” about future conduct. The
reasonable suspicion standard, however, implies a certain gloss of expertise, espe-
cially when stripped of any meaningful judicial oversight. This gloss was punctured
by Justice Marshall during oral argument in Terry:
MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL: Mr. Payne, in this case this arresting
officer testified, did he not, that he had never seen anybody “case
a joint”?
MR. PAYNE [for the Respondent]: That is correct; he did so testify.
109 Brief for the NAACP Legal Defense & Educational Fund, Inc. as Amicus Curiae,
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (No. 67) [hereinafter Brief for NAACP Legal Defense &
Educ. Fund].
110 Id. at 7.
111 Id. at 41–42 (internal citations omitted).
112 It should be noted that the 2013 Watchlisting Guidance confirmed suspicions that nu-
merous exceptions existed to the reasonable suspicion standard. See, e.g., NAT’L COUNTER-
TERRORISM CTR., supra note 84, at paras. 1.58, 1.59, 3.15.2; see also Sinnar, supra note 87,
at 1593–96.
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MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL: He also testified that he had been on
that same area for some thirty years, doing the following things:
Checking for pick-pockets, and shoplifters?
MR. PAYNE: That’s correct.
MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL: So, where did he get his expertise
about somebody about to commit a robbery?
MR. PAYNE: I think that he would get his expertise by virtue of the
fact that he had been a member of the police department for forty
years, and by being a member of the police department for forty
years I am quite sure that, even if by osmosis, some knowledge
would have to come to him of the various degrees of crimes—
MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL: Now we’re getting intuition by osmosis?
[Laughter.]113
Under the heading “The Genius of Probable Cause,” Greenberg emphasized in his
brief the crucial role of “the interposition of judicial judgment between the police de-
cision to intrude and the allowability of intrusion.”114 The judicial role for which the
NAACP argued in the context of the Fourth Amendment applies with equal strength
in the Fifth Amendment context of terrorist watchlists (even if probable cause might
not be the appropriate standard).115 Greenberg quoted Justice Jackson on the point:
The point of the Fourth Amendment, which often is not grasped by
zealous officers, is not that it denies law enforcement the support
of the usual inferences which reasonable men draw from evidence.
Its protection consists in requiring that those inferences be drawn
by a neutral and detached magistrate instead of being judged by
the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferret-
ing out crime. Any assumption that evidence sufficient to sup-
port a magistrate’s disinterested determination to issue a search
warrant will justify the officers in making a search without a
warrant would reduce the Amendment to a nullity and leave the
people’s homes secure only in the discretion of police officers.116
The brief made particularly clear the unequal application of police practices on the
basis of race and socio-economic class. And here it is worth making a final point about
that factor in watchlisting, too. Study of the Supreme Court’s opinion in Terry v. Ohio
will reveal no indication of the different races of the parties.117 But as both the
113 Transcript of Oral Argument at 13, Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (No. 67).
114 Brief for NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, supra note 109, at 21.
115 See id. at 25–26.
116 Id. (quoting Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13–14 (1948)).
117 Indeed, the opinion makes only a brief and general allusion to “[t]he wholesale harassment
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NAACP brief and later scholarship on the case make clear, race was likely a central
factor: Officer McFadden was white; John Terry and his partner were black.118 The
Supreme Court opinion states that McFadden “was unable to say precisely what first
drew his eye to them.”119 But he did testify that “when I looked over they didn’t look
right to me at the time.”120 One wonders why. Some have sharply criticized the TSC for
making watchlisting determinations that seem to rely on highly questionable proxies,
such as religion or national origin, often submerged in loose labels.121 The TSC has al-
ways denied such accusations,122 but the opacity of their operations make such denials
hard to confirm. Anecdotal evidence suggests that the problem is a persistent one.123
CONCLUSION
During oral argument in the Terry case, Justice Marshall put his finger on the
police interest in a lower, “reasonable suspicion” standard for detaining citizens. The
police were interested in a useful tool for people that “beared watching.”124 Terrorist
by certain elements of the police community, of which minority groups, particularly Negroes,
frequently complain.” Terry, 392 U.S. at 14.
118 See, e.g., Lewis R. Katz, Terry v. Ohio at Thirty-Five: A Revisionist View, 74 MISS.
L.J. (SPECIAL ISSUE) 423, 429, 432–33 (2004).
119 Terry, 392 U.S. at 5.
120 Id.; see also John Q. Barrett, State of Ohio v. Richard D. Chilton and State of Ohio v.
John W. Terry: The Suppression Hearing and Trial Transcripts, 72 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1387
app. at 1456 (1998) (reproducing cross-examination of Detective McFadden at one of the
criminal trials, at which he testified: “Some people that don’t look right to me, I will watch them.
Now, in this case when I looked over they didn’t look right to me at the time.”). But see Payne,
supra note 99, at 734–35 (asserting from his personal experience with the Terry case, that
McFadden’s statement “I didn’t like them” was not racially charged: “Knowing McFadden,
that statement had not one single thing to do with their race. It had to do with his previous
observations studying people in general, as well as people who commit crimes and people
who are involved in criminal activity. His statement referred to the classification of people
which his duty called for him to be on the lookout for when he said he didn’t like them.”).
121 See, e.g., Sinnar, supra note 87, at 1594–95.
122 See id. at 1585, 1595–96.
123 See, e.g., Petula Dvorak, A Retired Police Chief Is Detained at JFK for One Reason:
His Name Is Hassan, WASH. POST (Mar. 20, 2017), http://www.washingtonpost.com/local
/a-retired-police-chief-is-detained-at-jfk-for-one-reason-his-name-is-hassan/2017/03/20/2c61
8fe2-0d7d-11e7-9b0d-d27c98455440_story.html [https://perma.cc/ZF4A-5ZDU]. Thus, it
was equally newsworthy, but for opposite reasons, when a person who was not one of the
usual suspects—a fourteen-year-old white, middle class, New Hampshire resident—found
himself entangled in the watchlists. See Jason Schreiber, Keene Family Tries to Clear Up
Terror Watchlist Confusion, N.H. UNION LEADER, Mar. 1, 2017, 2017 WLNR 6871522.
124 Transcript of Oral Argument at 14, Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (No. 67). In a
letter to Chief Justice Warren that accompanied a proposed, revised draft of the opinion,
Justice Brennan recognized the same pressure:
I’ve become acutely concerned that the mere fact of our affirmance in
Terry will be taken by the police all over the country as our license to
them to carry on, indeed widely expand, present “aggressive surveillance”
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watchlists, of course, are defined by that purpose. But to reference an old saying,
who watches the watchers?
Justice Douglas was the sole dissenter in Terry v. Ohio. He could not have
imagined a world of terrorist watchlists (although he himself was subject to the
caprice of the State Department’s infamous Passport Office, the analog precursor to
the digital No-Fly List).125 But his concluding words are prescient:
There have been powerful hydraulic pressures throughout our his-
tory that bear heavily on the Court to water down constitutional
guarantees and give the police the upper hand. That hydraulic
pressure has probably never been greater than it is today.
Yet if the individual is no longer to be sovereign, if the police
can pick him up whenever they do not like the cut of his jib, if
they can “seize” and “search” him in their discretion, we enter
a new regime.126
That “hydraulic pressure” does not lessen in the context of counterterrorism. On
the contrary, terrorist watchlists are symptomatic of that “new regime,” oddly one
that the majority in our society seem to support, when they even reflect on its existence.
First, the appetite for expanding watchlists is unabated. In a PowerPoint presentation
techniques which the press tell us are being deliberately employed in
Miami, Chicago, Detroit + other ghetto cities.
John Q. Barrett, Deciding the Stop and Frisk Cases: A Look Inside the Supreme Court’s
Conference, 72 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 749, 825 (1998) (quoting a Letter from Justice William
J. Brennan, Jr. to Chief Justice Earl Warren (Mar. 14, 1968)). Brennan noted the effect of po-
litical pressure in an election year, as well as “the already white heat resentment of ghetto
Negroes against the police” before concluding “I am truly worried.” Id. at 826. According
to Professor Barrett’s research into the unpublished papers of the justices in and following
their conference, Terry was substantially “ghost-written” for Chief Justice Warren by Justice
Brennan, its “shadow author.” Id. at 838, 843.
125 See KAHN, supra note 13, at 124.
126 Terry, 392 U.S. at 39. Citing these words, Justice Marshall reflected bitterly on the
results of Terry in a dissenting opinion four years later:
It seems that the delicate balance that Terry struck was simply too deli-
cate, too susceptible to the “hydraulic pressures” of the day. As a result
of today’s decision, the balance struck in Terry is now heavily weighted
in favor of the government. And the Fourth Amendment, which was in-
cluded in the Bill of Rights to prevent the kind of arbitrary and oppressive
police action involved herein, is dealt a serious blow. Today’s decision
invokes the specter of a society in which innocent citizens may be
stopped, searched, and arrested at the whim of police officers who have
only the slightest suspicion of improper conduct.
Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 162 (1972).
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to Congress in 2009, TSC Director Timothy Healy encouraged expansive use of the
Terrorist Screening Database to include restrictions on government benefits, licenses,
access to mass sporting events, passports, and a wide range of other government bene-
fits and staples of modern American life.127 Police making routine traffic stops may
now check to see if the driver of a car is identified on a terrorist watchlist. Following
the mass shooting at an Orlando nightclub in June 2016, renewed calls came for a “No-
Buy” List that would prohibit those on the Terrorist Screening Database from access
to guns.128 Eighty-five percent of registered voters favored such a use of watchlists.129
Second, the “hydraulic pressure” to resist judicial review continues unabated.
Although the Ibrahim case in California was the only No-Fly List litigation to re-
ceive a bench trial, the long-running litigation in Latif v. Holder (and then Lynch,
and now Sessions) in Oregon has been the bellwether for establishing greater due
process and judicial review for watchlists.130 The thirteen plaintiffs in this seven-
year-long lawsuit alleged that their procedural and substantive due process rights
had been violated by their secret placement on the No-Fly List.131 In a series of
opinions, Judge Anna Brown found that the current procedures for resolving chal-
lenges to the No-Fly List violated the Fifth Amendment by its combination of a low-
threshold reasonable suspicion test and a one-sided, often closed administrative
record that failed to give the plaintiffs a meaningful opportunity to challenge (or
even know) their status.132 She ordered the TSA to reveal to the plaintiffs whether
they were, in fact, on the No-Fly List and to “fashion new procedures that provide
Plaintiffs with the requisite due process . . . without jeopardizing national security”
to challenge that status if they believed it to be wrong.133 Judge Brown was willing
to tolerate continued use of the reasonable suspicion standard if the government
provided “(1) a statement of reasons that is sufficient to permit such Plaintiff to
respond meaningfully and (2) any material exculpatory or inculpatory information
in Defendants’ possession that is necessary for such a meaningful response.”134
127 PowerPoint on file with author.
128 See Jeffrey Kahn, Opinion, A ‘No Buy’ List for Guns Is a Bad Idea, N.Y. TIMES, July 1,
2016, at A23.
129 CNN/ORC INTERNATIONAL POLL (June 16–19, 2016), https://i2.cdn.turner.com/cnn
/2016/images/06/20/cnn_orc_poll_june_20.pdf [https://perma.cc/9YYF-6FND].
130 See, e.g., Latif v. Sessions, No. 3:10-cv-00750-BR, 2017 WL 1434648 (D. Or. Apr. 21,
2017); Latif v. Lynch, No. 3:10-cv-00750-BR, 2016 WL 1239925 (D. Or. Mar. 28, 2016);
Latif v. Holder, 28 F. Supp. 3d 1134 (D. Or. 2014). A more detailed description of this case
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at paras. 5–6, 26–27, 145–46, Latif v. Holder, No. 3:10-cv-00750-BR (D. Or. Jan. 11, 2013),
ECF No. 83.
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The Justice Department returned to Judge Brown with revised procedures for citi-
zens and lawful permanent residents seeking to challenge their No-Fly List status.135
These were not the product of any notice-and-comment rulemaking by any of the
agencies involved, nor were the new rules published anywhere in a complete and
unchanging form.136 The new procedures promised no more than an “unclassified
summary of reasons” to the challenger and a “summary . . . [that] does not necessar-
ily include all underlying documentation” to the TSA administrator who would now
issue “a final order . . . [that] will state the basis for the decision [to remove or
maintain a person on the No Fly List] to the extent possible without compromising
national security or law enforcement interests.”137
That “final order” was the key to the next step in the litigation. At the start of
2017, the Justice Department filed another motion to dismiss this long-running
lawsuit from the district court’s jurisdiction.138 The revised procedures to challenge
a No-Fly List determination now resulted in a final order from the TSA Administra-
tor.139 Under the old FAA statute, the Justice Department argued, only the court of
appeals could review that decision.140 That April, Judge Brown issued an opinion
upholding the revised procedures and concluding, “in the unique procedural posture
of this case that jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ remaining substantive claims explicitly
lies in the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals pursuant to § 46110[,]” the old FAA
statute used previously to strip jurisdiction.141 Thus, unless another appeal is made
(which seems likely), the participation of a trial court empowered to take evidence
and evaluate the reasonableness of the watchlisters’ suspicion was lost again. The
reasonable suspicion standard transplanted into this new context was again without
the essential structural protection that Chief Justice Warren and seven of his brethren
thought essential to its legitimate operation.
The Justice Department’s aggressive effort to reach this conclusion reveals the
watchlisters’ particularly chilling insistence that, in the words of the NAACP brief
in Terry v. Ohio, judges “are not to take an independent view of police logic.”142 Such
zealous guarding of the watchlisters’ view of the facts, insulated from cross-exami-
nation or discovery by a would-be litigant, fails to recognize the value in Chief Justice
Warren’s requirement that a lower standard for police action be matched with “the
more detached, neutral scrutiny of a judge . . . .”143 The danger of institutional bias
135 See Joint Stipulations Regarding Jurisdiction at paras. 10–11, Latif v. Lynch, No. 3:10-
cv-00750-BR (D. Or. Dec. 20, 2016), ECF No. 347.
136 Id.
137 Id. at paras. 15, 18, 21.
138 See Memorandum in Support of Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Juris-
diction at 4, Latif v. Lynch, No. 3:10-cv-00-750-BR (D. Or. Jan. 18, 2017), ECF No. 348.
139 Id. at 9–10.
140 See id.
141 Latif v. Sessions, No. 3:10-cv-00750-BR, 2017 WL 1434648, at *7 (D. Or. Apr. 21, 2017).
142 Brief for NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, supra note 109, at 41.
143 Terry, 392 U.S. at 21.
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(which is not to suggest malice) is too real. What is more, the tradition of this impor-
tant separation-of-powers check on the state’s power is a long one, integral to our
system of government, which one might think would be adequate response to the
watchlisters’ implicit insistence to “trust us” to self-police.144 In the words of Justice
Douglas, “[w]e should not let those fences of the law be broken down.”145
But even well-established fences can be blown down by strong winds of fear;
as Douglas knew, “passions often carry the day.”146 Consider the working environ-
ment created for the analysts and other staff working at the TSC. Outside the TSC,
a three-story tall remnant of the distinctive architecture from the base of one of the
World Trade Center towers is placed as a sculpture outside the entrance to the TSC.
In a television interview conducted with the Director of the TSC, Christopher
Piehota, pictures of that artefact, and images of artefacts from the bombing of the
U.S.S. Cole, the attempted bombing of Northwest Airlines Flight 253 (the “under-
wear bomber” attack), and the Oklahoma City bombing, are shown from displays
outside and within the building. As they are shown, Director Piehota described their
importance in a voice overlay:
This means to me that the Terrorist Screening Center’s mission
will never be done. And it reminds us daily of the importance of
what we do. The threat is ever-present. And the remnants were
put here to remind our staff of our mission, which is to prevent
acts of terrorism. It keeps us mindful of the threat that is still out
there. Each remnant or each artifact shows you the evolution of
terrorism.147
In front of a remnant of the point of impact of one of the airplanes into the North
Tower of the World Trade Center on display within the TSC building, CNN corre-
spondent Pamela Brown asked Director Piehota, “Every day you come in and say:
‘We’re not going to let this happen again.’”148 Director Piehota responded: “This,
that, cannot ever happen again.”149
Who would want anything less than such a zealous devotion to the mission of
preventing terrorist attacks? But who, valuing liberty, would think it reasonable to
give that voice the final word?
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